MetaCatholic

(This post is part of a series on the 39 articles of the Church of England)

One of the most bizarre features of the twenty-first of the 39 articles is the implicit contradiction between the emphasis on scriptural authority at the end, and its opening statement on the place of princes in calling church councils. Oddly enough, my Bible seems to omit the information that Herod summoned the Jerusalem Council. It is a sign of some of the confusions over authority that Cranmer resolves very poorly.

XXI. Of the Authority of General Councils
General Councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of Princes. And when they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God,) they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God. Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture.

Given that scripture is prescriptively silent on councils, but descriptively narrates a gathering which comes to be seen (not inappropriately) as the first council, it is rather hard to say that anything significant about councils is taken out of scripture, rather than the developing tradition and practice of the Church. But insofar as the Acts narrative relates a council, it is clearly a decision of the church and its leading apostolic figures. That, of course, is a problem for Cranmer, since while it would be just about possible (though I think also a misreading of Acts) to say that councils can’t be gathered without the consent of the Pope. Given Peter’s role, this view can be, just about, declared as “taken out of Holy Scripture”. The view that they need “the commandment and will of Princes” simply cannot be declared scriptural in a like manner.

Underlying this is a more serious problem. It is quite possible to say councils “may err” although the Catholic response to erring councils has been to declare that they are not in fact councils of the church, and remove them from the list of those recognised as such. But the idea that gatherings of the church, or some part of it, may err is still there under that sleight of hand. What is different is that largely it was a subsequent council that recognised this error, such as the way in which Chalcedon (451 AD) overturned the Second (Robber) Council of Ephesus (449 AD) — this despite it having been called under imperial authority. But who, apart from another council, can authoritatively say that a previous one has erred?

Well, in one sense, Cranmer’s answer is an appropriate one: scripture can say a council has erred, but this fails largely to deal with the issue that scripture needs interpreting. Councils generally (and whether rightly or wrongly) declare their teaching to be an interpretation of scripture, and to teach things “taken out of Holy Scripture”. Exactly how authoritative in standing against this collegial declaration is an individual theologian’s or bishop’s (never mind an individual Christian’s) statement that a council has erred? In one sense it is not authoritative at all: it can only be a persuasive statement of scriptural teaching or meaning, to argue that the council has failed to give an adequate account of scripture. Its authority is intrinsic and lies in its own reasoned integrity. It has to appeal to, renew, or even re-create, the sensus fidelium.

Where Cranmer is right is to insist that there should be consonance between council and scripture. Neither the interpretation of the collegium, nor that of the individual, should be arbitrary, imposed simply by external authority, but themselves subject to the authority exercised by God through the Church’s reading of the scriptures. Where he is wrong is in failing to develop an adequate account of the Church, a point noted in previous posts.

A coherent critique needs to reflect more on the Church’s being under authority, and not simply having authority. It needs to take on board finer nuances of the relationship of scripture and tradition, and not a simple opposition. It needs to reflect on conciliarity and collegiality in the way that post-Vatican II Catholicism has done in theory, but miserably failed to do in practice, and so needs to take councils more seriously than this bare statement does. It needs to reflect on the role of the papacy in relation to the broader institution of episcopacy in terms other than jurisdiction: that is, it needs to conceive the Petrine ministry in a more mutual and non-hierarchical relation to the whole apostolic ministry. It needs in short, to offer a self-definition that is defined more positively and less negatively.

Derogating councils in the way this article does is unfortunate. It is as wrong-headed as the papal tendency to say “Le concile, c’est moi!” The meeting together of Christians generally is always essential to a proper hearing of the Scriptures, for which private study is a supplement. The meeting in argument, and debate around the scriptures, in attentiveness to the Spirit, of all those who are charged with the apostolic teaching ministry of the Church is a particular and focused way of doing what Christians do, for the purpose of resolving how to meet the challenges of the moment. Surely we should hope that God will hasten the day when an Ecumenical Council can be ecumenical in every sense of the word.